


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# STAFF NOTES:

## Western Europe Canada International Organizations

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February 18, 1975

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## WESTERN EUROPE — CANADA — INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Western Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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Security Council To Debate Cyprus

The focus of Greek and Greek Cypriot response to last week's proclamation of a Turkish Federated State of Cyprus has now shifted to the UN. Monday night, Cyprus asked the Chinese ambassador, who is president of the Security Council this month, to call an urgent meeting of the Council. Despite the demand of the Cypriot permanent representative for at least an initial meeting Tuesday so as not to lose momentum, the Council will not convene before Wednesday. Serious debate may be delayed until Thursday afternoon, when UN Secretary General Waldheim returns from discussions with Turkish and Greek leaders in Ankara and Athens. The Greeks and Greek Cypriots will use the time before the Council meeting to lobby among the Council's 15 members for the resolution they plan to table.

The Cypriot delegation leader, Clerides, has stated that the draft resolution will not be limited to a Security Council condemnation of Turkey's action. The Cypriots intend to press for implementation of previous UN resolutions which call for:

- The speedy withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cyprus.
- The safe return home of all refugees.
- The reaffirmation of the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and nonalignment of Cyprus.

In addition, Clerides has said that his delegation will press for imposition of UN sanctions against Turkey. It is unlikely that such a proposal would gain broad support.

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On Sunday, Turkish Foreign Minister Esenbel said that Greek plans to submit the issue for Security Council consideration would not weaken the Turkish Cypriots' resolve to set up their own state on the island. Turkish Cypriot Minister of Commerce and Industry Celik has flown to New York to defend his community's interests at the UN meeting. (Confidential)

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Sweden's "Too" Active Neutrality

Foreign Minister Sven Anderson last week defended publicly Sweden's policy of active neutrality against criticism of partiality toward both the East and the West.

In an interview published in Dagens Nyheter on February 14, Anderson denied that the Palme government was anti-American because of its position on Vietnam. The Foreign Minister said Sweden supports the Paris agreement, but is disappointed that the fighting continues. He said Sweden has no interest in Vietnam other than to see that it has an opportunity to decide its own future. Anderson did not repeat earlier criticism of US policy in Southeast Asia, and he did not indicate who was to blame for the continuation of hostilities in Vietnam.

Much of the interview was devoted to answering criticism from the Soviet Union and Finland about Swedish overtures toward the West. High on this list is Soviet concern about Swedish "guarantees" to four NATO countries that, if they buy the Viggen as a replacement plane for their air forces, Stockholm will assure deliveries even in war time. Anderson's statement that only the fighter version, not the attack version, was being offered to NATO probably did little to assuage Soviet concern.

Anderson also sidestepped criticism of a recently published survey by the Swedish supreme military commander concerning the potential threat caused by improved Soviet and Finnish highway and rail networks. He said the article may have been "misunderstood" and claimed his government regards such Soviet-Finnish cooperation as a contribution to peace and stability in the Nordic area. Anderson tempered this remark by dismissing the idea of Nordic-Soviet cooperation, saying that "the Soviet Union does not belong to the Nordic countries."

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
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1 | Despite the Arabs' use of oil "as a political weapon," Anderson said his government still supports the existence of Israel. He defended Sweden's support for PLO leader Arafat's appearance before the UN because of the "position" the PLO had with- in the Arab community. Anderson also felt that the discovery of oil in the North Sea "opened new possibilities" for Nordic cooperation.

2 | The interview reflects Anderson's difficult job in trying to balance Swedish neutrality. At least one Soviet diplomat--Belokvostikov, chief of Scandinavian affairs in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs--has complained to his Swedish counterparts about Stockholm's policy toward the West. In addition, the Swedes feel obligated to support the Finns because of their delicate rela- tionship with Moscow--thus the praise for Soviet- Finnish cooperation. As long as there is a remote possibility of selling Viggen aircraft to NATO members, the Swedish Foreign Ministry may be pressed even more to come up with unique explanations of its policy of "active" neutrality. (Confidential No Foreign Dissem)

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Disaffection Within Greek Military

Disaffection has again surfaced within the Greek armed forces, but it does not appear that any group has the necessary organization, support or leadership to mount a successful coup at this time.

The discontent stems largely from career insecurity resulting from the government's purge of senior junta officials and its seeming toleration of attacks against the military in the press. Resentment has also been expressed by some at the laxity of government measures against student demonstrators and government toleration of communist political activity.

Aside from a common desire to oust Prime Minister Karamanlis, the plotters have divergent goals. Some support former junta leader and ex-president George Papadopoulos. Others favor the return of the king. Still others favor rightist politicians other than Karamanlis.

While many hope to bring Greece back into the military structure of NATO, a smaller number may be willing to support leftist politicians such as Andreas Papandreu or Ilias Iliou. One report claims that a coup attempt may be imminent while others maintain it may not take place for some time.

According to [REDACTED] the Hellenic Army Command, which has been keeping a close watch for conspiratorial activity, is aware of talk about a coup among certain sectors of the officer corps but does not believe that an organized plot exists. According to [REDACTED] the threat of war with Turkey over Cyprus and the Aegean has deterred such a move. Other reporting also suggests the confrontation with Turkey has prevented disaffected elements from taking any precipitous action against Karamanlis. Once the crisis subsides, however, these elements may step up their activity, particularly if attacks against the military continue.


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Indications are, however, that Karamanlis is taking measures to curb criticism of the military. To this end, he has urged publishers to tone down their anti-junta stories, to limit their attacks to high junta officials, and to avoid criticism of the military in general. (Secret No Foreign Dissem/ Controlled Dissem/No Dissem Abroad/Background Use Only)

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